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Abstract
In this paper we explore some possible consequences of fallibility in managerial decision-
making for Þrm performance. Based on Sah and Stiglitz (1991), we develop the hypothesis
that if managers are fallible, Þrm performance will be more variable as the number of man-
agers participating in decision-making decreases, i.e. as the Þrm becomes more centralized.
We use characteristics of the Executive Office to develop a proxy for the number of executives
participating in top decision-making. For example, we argue that if the Chairman of the
Board is not the CEO, decision-making in the Þrm will be more decentralized because the
Chairman will also participate in decision-making. We test our hypothesis using this proxy
(which we call the centralization index), and Þnd that the evidence is consistent with our
hypothesis. Firm performance (measured by Tobins Q, stock returns and ROA) is signif-
icantly more variable for Þrms with greater values of our centralization index. The results
are consistent across various tests designed to detect differences in variability.
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Frictions in decision-making by top management have been the focus of a large number
of papers in the corporate Þnance literature. Most of this work is based on agency theory,
which emphasizes the possibility that the incentives of top managers and shareholders are
not perfectly aligned, creating the potential for value-decreasing distortions in the corporate
decision process (see for example the survey of corporate governance by Shleifer and Vishny,
1997). However, agency problems are not the only possible source of frictions in decision-
making. Real world decisions will also be constrained by the decision-making ability of top
managers. Even when they have the right incentives, managers may take wrong decisions
due to human fallibility, that is, managers can make mistakes.
In this paper, we explore some possible consequences of fallibility for executive decision-
making processes and consequently for Þrm value and Þrm performance. We develop a simple
hypothesis about how fallibility will affect Þrm performance drawing upon the theoretical
work of Sah and Stiglitz (1991). In Sah and Stiglitz (1991) managers can make good or bad
decisions due to fallibility, and in addition they differ in their degree of fallibility. Sah and
Stiglitzs (1991) key insight is that the impact of fallibility on Þrm performance will depend
on the size of the decision-making group. In an organization in which only a small group of
people is responsible for the most relevant decisions, the risk arising from human fallibility
in decision-making is not well diversiÞed. That is, the likelihood of either very good or very
bad decisions is higher in what Sah and Stiglitz (1991) call a centralized organization (one
in which only a small group of people make decisions) than in a decentralized organization
(one in which many persons are involved in decision-making). Thus, our main prediction
is that, as the degree of centralization increases, variability in Þrm value increases because
decisions with extreme consequences are more likely to be taken.1
In order to test our hypothesis we develop an index of centralization in decision-making,
1Sah (1991) uses the same arguments to conjecture that autocracies should have more volatile economic
growth than democracies. Almeida and Ferreira (2001) provide empirical evidence which is consistent with
Sahs conjecture.
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which is increasing in centralization. Our index uses the number of job titles of the CEO, the
retention of the CEO title by the Þrms founder, the CEO succession process and the overlap
of the Executive Office with the Board to proxy for the number of people participating
in decision-making. For example, we argue that if the Chairman of the Board is not the
CEO, decision-making in the Þrm will be more decentralized because the Chairman will also
participate in decision-making. Similarly, if the current CEO is the original founder of the
Þrm, he is more likely to have the power to make decisions on his own, hence we consider
such a Þrm to be more centralized.
Because our hypothesis concerns differences in variances, we apply three different het-
eroscedasticity tests to our data. The Goldfeld-Quandt test consists of comparing the vari-
ance of the performance variable (or the part of it not explained by an appropriate empirical
model) between groups of centralized and decentralized Þrms. The Glejser test uses regres-
sions which allow us to control for variables (other than centralization) which could also
explain the variability of performance. Both these tests use either a cross-section or a panel
of Þrms. We also use a third test which allows us to isolate the effect of centralization on
the within-Þrm, over-time variability of performance. Using these three tests we show that
Tobins Q is more variable for Þrms with greater values of our centralization index. Fur-
thermore, centralized Þrms show greater variability in stock returns and return on assets
(ROA).
It is important to stress that our interpretation of these results does not depend on
the existence of an agency problem. Even if managers are benevolent, there may still be
frictions induced by human fallibility. There are concrete examples from recent business
history that are consistent with this notion. For example, the CEO of AT&T (C. Michael
Armstrong) was considered one of Corporate Americas best and brightest when he started
at AT&T (Business Week, February 5th, 2001, Wall Street Journal, October 26th, 2000).
From 1997 to 1999, Armstrong pursued the strategy of trying to rebuild AT&T into a one-
stop shopping Telecommecca by a series of acquisitions. By the summer of 2000, this strategy
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was clearly going wrong, leading to the current restructuring. Even though Armstrong
pitches the restructuring as a sign of accomplishment, the market sees it as evidence that
the everything-under-one-roof strategy was a failure.2 Importantly, Armstrongs strategy
was initially hailed by the market, which makes it hard to interpret the facts in the context
of agency theory. One could argue that the acquisition strategy was the best one given the
available information at the time, and thus it was not a mistake. However, based on the same
information, AT&Ts President (John Zeglis) disagreed that the acquisition strategy was the
correct one (Wall Street Journal, October 26th, 2000). Subsequent events have proven that
John Zeglis concerns were justiÞed.
According to our hypothesis, decisions with extreme consequences (such as Armstrongs
acquisition strategy) are less likely to be taken if decision-making is more decentralized.
While our centralization index is only a proxy for the degree of centralization in decision-
making, we believe it will be highly correlated with the ability of the CEO to follow the
course of action which he thinks is the best one. We illustrate this point here using Toys
R Us. In 1999 the CEO of Toys R Us Robert Nakasone stepped down, because of
disagreements with the board which were believed to be heavily inßuenced by the founder,
Charles Lazarus, and the ex-CEO, Michael Goldstein, who was Chairman of the Board.
And the main concern about the new CEO John Eyler is that he may not have much room
to make changes (Business Week, December 4th 2000). Our index captures the relative
inability of the CEO to have a strong inßuence on decisions in this company. In fact, our
centralization index for Toys R US in 1998 and 1999 takes on its lowest possible value,
since the CEO, the Chairman and the founder are all different people, the CEO has no other
2For example, Brian Hayward, manager of Invesco Telecommunications Fund, sold his remaining shares
in AT&T after Armstrong announced the bust up plan. His own words:
Theyve been telling us up until now that bundled service is the way of the industry and now they are
telling us that these companies are ready to be taken apart. It insulted my intelligence. (Wall Street
Journal, October 26th 2000)
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title, the positions of President and COO exist, and there is an insider on the board other
than the CEO.
These two examples illustrate the notions that fallibility may be important, and that
the allocation of titles and the other features of the Executive Office that we capture in
our index might reßect the ability of the CEO to have an impact on decision-making. The
formal evidence that centralization is positively correlated with the variability of performance
is consistent with these ideas. However, one might still argue that this correlation could be
explained by alternative arguments.
For example, Amihud and Lev (1981), Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) and Saunders,
Strock and Travlos (1990) have argued that if managerial interests are not well aligned with
those of shareholders, then managers might engage in self-interested risk-reduction activities
such as conglomerate acquisitions. The authors thus predict a positive relationship between
managerial ownership and risk (which they measure using variability in accounting measures
of performance or stock returns). If managerial ownership is positively correlated with
centralization, then our result could be explained by this agency argument. However, even
though the correlation between ownership and variability is positive in our data, the effect
of centralization on variability is positive even after we control for CEO ownership.
Similarly, one might argue that our measure of centralization is simply capturing other
variables which could affect variability such as diversiÞcation, Þrm size, or Þrm age. Although
these variables affect variability in performance in the expected ways in our data, we show
that our index of centralization has an independent effect even after controlling for these other
determinants of variability. The effect of centralization on the variability of performance is
also economically signiÞcant, compared to the effect of these other variables. One less title
for the CEO (a one-standard-deviation change in the centralization index) has an effect on
variability which is equivalent to the addition of approximately one to two segments to the
Þrm, to 15 to 20 additional years of Þrm age, or to a decrease of 2% to 6% in CEO ownership.
Our deÞnition of centralization is based on the notion of centralization in Sah and Stiglitz
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(1991). Other authors (such as Jensen and Meckling, 1992, Stein, 2000 and Zabojnik, 2000)
have used this term in a different, although not unrelated way. In these papers centralization
is about the level of the hierarchy at which decision-making is carried out, rather than the size
of the decision-making group at a given level. For example, in Jensen and Meckling (1992)
the allocation of decision rights to lower-level managers mitigates information problems but
increases agency costs because lower level managers will have different goals than the CEO.
Thus, the optimal degree of decentralization (delegation) will depend on factors that affect
the relative importance of agency versus information costs, such as the size of the organization
and the rate of change in the environment. One of their predictions is that an increase in
variability increases the scope for managerial misbehavior (speciÞcally, moral hazard), and
hence decreases delegation.3 If an increase in the potential for managerial misbehavior also
increases our measure of centralization, then this could be an alternative explanation for the
positive correlation between our measure of centralization and variability.
However, we believe it is unlikely that an increase in the scope for managerial misbehavior
would lead to an increase in our measure of centralization. It is not obvious that as the
potential for misbehavior increases, the size of the decision-making group at the top of the
corporate hierarchy should decrease. For example, if the scope for agency problems increases
it might be desirable to separate the positions of Chairman of the Board and CEO (Core,
Holthausen and Larcker, 1999). Similarly, it might be desirable to have a CEO position
occupied by someone other than the founder. Separating these positions decreases our index
of centralization. Thus, we do not believe that the positive correlation between our proxy
for the size of the decision-making group and variability is driven by this agency argument.
We develop our theoretical hypothesis in section 1. In section 2, we describe our measure
of centralization. In section 3 we describe our sample in detail. We test our empirical
hypothesis in section 4. After establishing our result, we discuss possible implications and
3The idea that an increase in variability increases the scope for moral hazard has been explored in other
papers such as Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985).
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extensions in Section 5.
1 Theoretical Arguments and Empirical Implications
Our main goal in this paper is to test the hypothesis that centralization of decision-making at
the Þrm level leads to more variability in Þrm performance. This hypothesis can be motivated
using the theoretical arguments in Sah and Stiglitz (1991). In their model, decision-makers
are fallible in the sense that they make mistakes, and they differ in the probability of making
good and bad decisions (i.e., they differ in their degree of fallibility).
In the context of corporate decision-making, suppose a CEO makes all decisions alone. If
she is of the good type, she will make good decisions more often than if she were of the bad
type. Suppose that now the CEO and a second executive, say the Chairman of the Board,
have to agree before a decision is implemented.4 The Chairman again can be either of a
good or of a bad type. If the quality of both the CEO and the Chairman are not perfectly
correlated ex ante, the likelihood that a proposed good or bad decision is vetoed by one of the
executives is higher than it was when only the CEO was responsible for decisions. In other
words, there is more compromise in decision-making in the decentralized Þrm. Therefore,
either less decisions would be taken, or the Þnal decision taken would have to reßect the
different opinions of both executives. Therefore, a less centralized Þrm will tend to exhibit
less variability in decisions and thus in outcomes.
In Sah and Stiglitz (1991), there is no clear prediction for the relationship between the
degree of centralization and the organizations average performance. In the example above,
if the degree of fallibility of the CEO and the Chairman is the same, the average quality of
4Another possibility is that aggregate performance depends on the outcomes of several decisions, and
the responsibilities are divided between the Chairman and the CEO when they are different people. This is
actually closer in spirit to the situation described by Sah and Stiglitz (1991). However, the implications for
variability would be identical.
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decisions may not change. As Sah and Stiglitz (1991) discuss, the impact of decentralization
on average performance will also depend on the concavity of the function linking performance
and decisions. If this function is convex (concave), centralization (decentralization) should
increase average performance. Since we have no prior for the differential abilities of the
decision-makers or for the shape of the relationship between decisions and performance, we
have no prior for the effect of centralization on average performance.
The main implication of this analysis is then as follows. More centralized Þrms should
display higher variability in measures of Þrm performance such as Tobins Q, stock returns
and return on assets (ROA). This should hold both for cross-Þrm variability in performance,
and for variability of performance within the same Þrm. More speciÞcally, a sample of Þrms
which are relatively centralized should have more extreme performances (and thus higher
cross-sectional variability). Additionally, Þrms which are more centralized should display
higher variability in performance over time. In our empirical tests we attempt to test both
hypotheses jointly (by using a panel sample where both effects will be present), and also
separately by isolating the cross-sectional differences in performance and the differences in
performance over time for the same Þrm.
2 Measuring Centralization of Decision-Making
To test our hypothesis we develop a measure of centralization, which we call the decision-
making centralization index (or DC index for short). Since our focus is on the number
of decision-makers at a given level of the hierarchy, we examine decision-making in the
Executive Office. By Executive Office, we mean the tip of the managerial hierarchy. The
Executive Office has several features that we can use to estimate the number of participants
in decision-making.
For example, if the CEO is not the Chairman of the Board, we expect the Þrm to be
less centralized since the Chairman often has an important role in decision-making. The
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Chairman is frequently an ex-CEO, who retains the title of Chairman during a probationary
training period for the new CEO. During this period the old CEO passes on relevant
information to the new CEO. Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) also point out that giving an
ex-CEO the Chairman title eases his transition from active duty to retirement. This suggests
that upon becoming Chairman the former CEO still participates in decision-making.5
We also expect the overlap of the Executive Office with the board and the frequent re-
tention of the CEO title by the companys founder to inßuence the degree of centralization
in decision-making. Since the board is legally responsible for the management of the corpo-
ration, we expect that if an inside6 manager (other than the CEO) sits on the board, he is
more likely to participate in top decision-making. Thus, we consider Þrms with more than
one inside manager on the board to be less centralized.7
In addition, if the founder of the Þrm is not the CEO, the CEO might have to share
decision-making. Firms whose founder is the CEO should therefore be more centralized
than Þrms whose CEO is not the founder.
The CEO succession process of a Þrm also inßuences the degree of joint decision-making
in the Þrm to the extent that the successor of the CEO is involved in CEO decision-making
5An example of how an ex-CEO who retains the title of chairman can still have substantial inßuence
over the Þrms management is documented in Lehn and Treml (2000). The founder of JLG industries, John
L. Grove, was replaced in 1991 by L. David Black as the CEO of the company, but retained his position
as Chairman. The board determined in 1992 that Grove should withdraw from day-to-day activities and
concentrate on board activities, but he continued to have disagreements with the management team and
openly expressed his concerns about the state of affairs in the Þrm. The leadership conßict culminated with
the removal of Grove as chairman in 1993.
6As opposed to managers who are outsiders i.e. they do not work for the Þrm.
7One might argue that insiders just rubberstamp CEO decisions, and thus that this measure does not
capture an increase in the number of decision-makers. We do not believe this to be true. For example, in the
AT&T example we discuss in the introduction, the President and the CEO voiced different opinions about
AT&Ts diversiÞcation strategy. In any case, the presence of rubberstamping will make it harder for us to
Þnd our results.
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prior to becoming CEO. The two most familiar types of succession processes (e.g. Vancil
1987, Brickley, Coles and Jarrell 1997, Naveen 2000) are horse races, in which the Þrm
conducts a tournament among eligible candidates for the position of CEO, and passing the
baton, in which the Þrm chooses a designated successor for the CEO.8 In the latter case, a
new CEO also has the title of President (or COO). Once he plans his succession, he hands the
title of President or COO to the heir apparent. If the CEO has an heir apparent then there
is a gain to grooming him by involving him in CEO level decision-making. There are many
cases of Þrms in which the designated successor to the CEO voices his opinion on strategy
as, for example, AT&Ts President, John Zeglis, did about CEO C. Michael Armstrongs
cable strategy (Wall Street Journal, October 26th 2000). Thus, if the CEO is not also the
President (or COO), we expect decision-making to be less centralized.
It is plausible that the candidates for the CEO position will participate less in CEO
decision-making in a horse race than when the CEO passes the baton. If the Þrm conducts
a tournament for the CEO, then it may be difficult to involve all candidates fairly in CEO
decision-making.9 In addition, involving the candidates in CEO decision-making may have
drawbacks since the losers of the tournament generally leave the Þrm.10 Thus, we consider
Þrms which are passing the baton to be less centralized than Þrms which conduct horse races
for the CEO position.
8These are probably also the most common types of succession plans. Naveen (2000) Þnds in a sample
of 691 successions of the Þrms in the 1991 Forbes compensation survey during 1987-1997 that the CEO was
the former President 58% of the time. Canella and Lubatkin (1993) Þnd that over two thirds of the CEOs
in their sample were President of their Þrm at the time of their appointment.
9Jack Welch does not describe his own competition for the CEO position of GE as a very participatory
experience: I had to come to work for three years, and sit with seven other candidates in a dining room
and stare at each other. (Hill, 2000)
10The case of General Electric illustrates this argument (Hill, 2000). There were three candidates for Jack
Welchs position in 2001: James McNerney, Robert Nardelli, and Jeffrey Immelt. Once Immelt was named
CEO-elect, McNerney and Nardelli were expected to leave the Þrm. Even while the tournament was being
conducted Jack Welch was depicted as the primary decision-maker in the media.
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The overlap of the Executive Office with the Board, the CEO succession process and the
retention of the CEO title by the Þrms founder are all interconnected. The heir apparent to
the CEO is usually also appointed to the board (Hermalin and Weisbach 1988).11 When the
CEO is also the founder there is less likely to be a formal succession process. Thus both for
simplicity and to obtain one measure we can use to perform some of our empirical tests in
the next section,12 we summarize the centralization-related aspects of the Executive Office
in one measure that is increasing in centralization (DC index).
We deÞne our centralization index DC as the sum of 7 indicator variables ichair, inoiob,
ifounder, ipresident, iother, inopres, and inocoo. ichair is equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman,
inoiob is equal to 1 if there is no other insider on the board other than the CEO, ifounder is
equal to 1 if the CEO is the founder of the company, ipresident is equal to 1 if the CEO is
also the president, iother is equal to 1 if the CEO has any other title (such as COO), inopres
is equal to 1 if the Þrm has no president, and inocoo is equal to 1 if the Þrm has no COO. We
include iother because the title of the CEOs heir apparent may vary across Þrms.
The two variables inopres and inocoo are proxies for the type of succession process in the
Þrm.13 If a Þrms succession process typically consists of a horse race, then the candidates
for the CEO position are more likely to be of equal rank and thus have titles such as Vice
President or Executive Vice President (Naveen, 2000) or, as in the case of Jack Welchs
succession (Hill, 2000), the candidates may have titles associated with different divisions.
In this case the Þrm will be less likely to have a President or COO, thus the absence of a
President or COO is a sign that decision-making is more centralized.14
11The number of candidates in a horse race may be too large to accommodate on the board. For example,
the number of people competing in the horse race for the position of CEO of General Electric in 1980 was
7.
12For example, the Goldfeld-Quandt heteroscedasticity test requires that we rank the observations along
a single dimension.
13This is similar to the argument in Naveen (2000) who classiÞes Þrms which have a President or COO
distinct from the CEO as those with succession plans.
14The reason we use two separate dummy variables is to ensure that a Þrm in which the CEO is the
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In general it would be difficult to construct such a measure of centralization at a level of
the organization below that of the Executive Office. While decision-making within a certain
division could be characterized as centralized or decentralized it would be unclear how to
account for the allocation of responsibility across divisions. However since decision-making
in the Executive Office, and more speciÞcally CEO decision-making, will arguably have the
most pronounced impact on performance, we consider our measure to be the most relevant
proxy for our notion of centralization.
3 Data Description
Our sample consists of data on publicly traded Þrms in the 1998 Fortune 500 during 1992-
1999. We restrict our sample to exclude Þnancial Þrms and utilities because, as Saunders,
Strock and Travlos (1990) point out, the presence of a regulator may affect decision-making
in regulated Þrms (in their paper speciÞcally: risk-taking in banks). We further restrict our
sample to the set of Þrms for which data is available on ExecuComp (2000). From Standard
and Poors ExecuComp (2000) we obtain information on all executives mentioned in the
Þrms executive compensation table as well as Þnancial information. We obtain monthly
stock returns for the sample Þrms as well as value-weighted market returns from CRSP.
We gather the remaining Þnancial information from Compustat and the date of the Þrms
incorporation from Moodys Industrial Manuals (1999), proxy statements and annual reports
for Þscal 1998. Our Þnal sample consists of 2,633 Þrm-years of data and 34,158 monthly stock
returns for 336 Þrms during the 1992-1999 time period.
The data we gather on executives from ExecuComp (2000) consists of 16,022 executive-
President and the Chairman is equally centralized as a Þrm which conducts a horse race and in which the
CEO is also the Chairman. If the succession generally occurs through the President title then it is not likely
that the Þrm has a COO (in our sample, in only 811 out of 15978 Þrm-years there is both a President and
a COO). Thus, for such a Þrm, disregarding the other dummy variables, DC = 3, which is the same value
as that of a Þrm which conducts a horse race and in which the CEO is also the Chairman.
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years of data for our 336 sample Þrms during the 1992-1999 time period. This data contains
information on whether the named executive sits on the board and the title of each executive.
If the named executive is the CEO we also obtain the year in which he became CEO and his
ownership in the Þrm.15 We use the data on executives to construct a data set of Þrm-years
containing CEO ownership, CEO tenure as CEO and the Þrst 6 indicator variables necessary
to construct ourDC index, inoiob, inopres, inocoo, ipresident, iother, ichair. We deÞne inoiob in a given
year to be equal to 1 if no executive mentioned in the Þrms executive compensation table
except the CEO sits on the board in that year. Similarly we deÞne inopres (inocoo) to be equal
to 1 in a given year if the Þrm has no president (COO) amongst the executives mentioned in
the compensation table for that year. According to Regulation S-K of the Securities Act of
1933, the executives described in a Þrms compensation table must include the 4 highest paid
executives in the Þrm other than the CEO. While it is feasible that other insiders sit on the
board or that the president (COO) is not amongst the top 4 executives in terms of salary, we
consider it unlikely. We use the title of the CEO in a given year to set ipresident (iother/ichair)
equal to 1 if the CEO is also the president (has any other title/is also the chairman) in that
year.
Since ExecuComp (2000) does not contain information on whether the CEO is also the
founder, we deÞne ifounder in a given year to be 0 if the Þrm was incorporated at least 64
years prior to the current year or if the current CEO joined the company at least 4 years after
the date of the Þrms incorporation.16 For the remaining Þrm-years we checked whether the
15In Execucomp the data item containing the proportional ownership of the CEO is often missing if
ownership is less than 5%. We therefore calculate it as the ratio of the number of shares owned by the CEO
to total shares outstanding after adjusting the number of shares owned by the CEO for stock splits. While
Execucomp adjusts the total shares outstanding for stock splits it may not adjust CEO ownership (as can
be seen in the case of CEO Bill Gates of Microsoft), however it does include an adjustment factor (Access
item: AJEX) that can be used to adjust ownership.
16The longest period of time a CEO has been working for his Þrm in our sample is 59 years. We use
64 years as a cutoff to account for missing data on CEO Þrm tenure. Since most Þrms are founded several
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current CEO was the founder in a variety of sources consisting of proxy statements, annual
reports and the internet.17 We set ifounder in a given year equal to 1 if any source explicitly
named the current CEO as a founder or the main executive at the time the company began
(including when it was spun-off).
In addition to constructing the centralization index, we construct two performance mea-
sures for our sample Þrms, Tobins Q (Q) and return on assets (ROA). Our measure of
Tobins Q is the ratio of the Þrms market value to its book value. The Þrms market value is
calculated as book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of eq-
uity. We deÞne ROA as the ratio of net income before extraordinary items and discontinued
operations to its book value of assets. In Table 1 we present summary statistics concerning
select Þnancial variables, CEO characteristics and our centralization measure DC index. In
most Þrm-years another insider other than the CEO sits on the board (70%). Likewise in
most Þrm-years Þrms have a President (74%). They are less likely to have a COO (35%).
Consequently CEOs are also less likely to have a title other than President (27%) or Chair
(86%). In 9% of Þrm-years the CEO is also the founder. Table 2 shows that our compilation
of this information into DC index is fairly evenly distributed with DC index taking on the
values 0, 1 and 2 approximately 50% of the time and 3, 4, and 5 the other 50% of the time
with a resulting mean of 2.42 for the entire sample.
years prior to the date of incorporation this procedure ensures that we check more CEOs than are likely to
be founders.
17When we could Þnd the name of a Þrms original founder this procedure was straightforward. However,
very few proxies, annual reports or company websites disclosed the name of the original founder. We were
most successful doing a search with the name of the executive and the word founder using the Google search
engine.
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4 Empirical Tests
In this section we test whether our decision-making centralization (DC) index increases the
variability of performance measures. In order to do this we apply several heteroscedasticity
tests to our data, and use different measures of performance such as Q,stock returns and
ROA. We focus initially on Q, and in section 4.4 we consider stock returns and ROA.
Our hypothesis has implications both for the variability of performance across Þrms
(since more centralized Þrms should have more extreme performances), and for within-Þrm
variability of performance (since a more centralized Þrm should have higher variability in
performance over time). Thus we perform our tests using a panel of Þrms (where both
effects should be present), and we also try to isolate the cross-Þrm and within Þrm effects.
We do the former by replicating the same tests we perform for the panel using the averages
of all variables from 1992 to 1999. We do the latter (in section 4.5) by regressing the
standard deviation of the performance measures over 1992-1999 on the centralization index
and controls.
4.1 Empirical Model for Tobin’s Q
Our heteroscedasticity tests require us to specify a model for TobinsQ.We estimate a similar
model as Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), Yermack (1996), and Himmelberg, Hubbard and
Palia (1999). The main difference is that we include the DC index because centralization
may affect average performance (even though we have no prior for the direction of this
relationship, as discussed in section 1).
We regressQ onDC, current and one-year lagged return on assets, CEO ownership and its
square, log of assets (a proxy for Þrm size), Þrm growth (measured by capital expenditures
over sales), Þrm age (measured by the number of years since the date of incorporation),
industry dummies (two digit SIC code dummies) and year dummies (in our panel regressions).
Table 3 shows the output of two different regressions. The Þrst one is a is a panel
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regression in which every Þrm-year is counted as one observation. The second one is a cross-
sectional regression with the variables averaged over the 1992-99 period. The coefficients
on all variables are broadly consistent with the ones estimated in previous literature. As
evidenced by the low t-statistics, the coefficients on the DC index are not signiÞcantly
different from zero. This does not mean that centralization should be completely unrelated
to Þrm performance. As we argued in section 1, decision-making centralization should affect
the variance of Þrms market valuation. Figure 1 presents some descriptive evidence which
is consistent with our hypothesis. We plot the Tobins Q residuals from the cross-sectional
regressions for the Þrms with the highest 20% and the lowest 20% values of the centralization
index. The visual evidence in Figure 1 is consistent with our main hypothesis, since cross-
sectional variability is clearly higher in the more centralized sample. We now turn to formal
tests of this hypothesis using some standard heteroscedasticity tests.
4.2 Goldfeld-Quandt Heteroscedasticity Tests
In this section, we apply the Goldfeld-Quandt (1965) heteroscedasticity test to our data.18
This requires us to divide our sample into centralized and decentralized Þrms, and to apply
the true empirical model for Tobins Q to each sub-sample separately. We focus Þrst on
the model we speciÞed in the previous section, but we also perform the test using the raw
Q variable. The reason for this is to check that the result is not too dependent on our
speciÞcation of the model for Q. In the latter case, the Goldfeld-Quandt test collapses into
a standard test of comparing variances between two different samples.
Since the median of the DC index is 2, we deÞne the decentralized sub-sample in our
panel sample as the one containing observations withDC indices of 0 to 2 and the centralized
sub-sample as the one with DC indices ranging from 3 to 5. In our cross-sectional sample,
DC indices are averages over 8 years, therefore they are not necessarily integer values. In
18For more details on this test see Greene (1993).
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that case, we use median DC value of 2.5 as the cut-off point.
Using the residuals from the two separate regressions, we compute the sum of the squares
of the residuals (RSS) for each group. Under the assumption of normality of these residuals,
the ratio of the RSS of the Þrst group to the RSS of the second group should follow
an F−distribution with n1 − k and n2 − k degrees of freedom of the numerator and the
denominator, respectively, where ni is the number of observations in group i, i = 1, 2, and k
is the number of regressors. Therefore, to test the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity against
the alternative that more centralized Þrms have greater variance in their market valuations
than decentralized ones, we create an F−statistic by dividing the RSS for the centralized
group by the RSS of the decentralized group and compare it with critical values from F -
tables with the appropriate degrees of freedom. An F−statistic greater than 1 is evidence
against the null and in favor of the hypothesis of greater variance under centralization.
The results (reported in Table 4) are consistent with our hypothesis. For both the cross-
section and panel samples, the F−statistic is greater than one and highly signiÞcant, with
virtually zero p-values.
In columns III and IV of Table 4 we report the results using the raw Q variable, instead
of the residuals from the model. The results are the same, with somewhat greater p-values.
This suggests that results are robust to alternate speciÞcations of the model for Q.
The difference in variances also appears to be economically signiÞcant. The implied ratio
of variances goes from 1.05 to 2.20.19 This implies that the standard deviation of Tobins Q
is higher in the centralized sample, by a factor varying from 3% to 50%.20
4.3 Tests Based on Regressions
One of the weaknesses of the tests in the previous subsection is that observations can only
be ranked by one variable at a time. Therefore, we cannot test whether decision-making
19One estimate for the variance is just the residual sum of squares divided by the degrees of freedom.
20We will analyze economic signiÞcance in more detail using the results in Table 9.
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centralization affects performance variability after controlling for other variables that might
also affect variance.
For example, Amihud and Lev (1981) explain differences in the variability of performance
by appealing to an agency argument. They argue that Þrms with disperse ownership (Þrms
with more severe agency problems) engage in more conglomerate acquisitions in order to re-
duce risk, even when this is not optimal for shareholders. If the CEO has higher ownership,
he will have less incentives to reduce risk (see also Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987, and Saun-
ders, Strock and Travlos, 1990). This could induce a positive correlation between managerial
ownership and variability in performance. To ensure that our measure of centralization is
not capturing this agency effect, we need to be able to control for CEO ownership.
Another possibility is that our index simply reßects the degree of diversiÞcation. Firms
with more segments may need more people making decisions, and thus appear less cen-
tralized. Such Þrms may also have less variability because of the effect of diversiÞcation.
Thus, diversiÞcation could generate a spurious positive correlation between centralization
and variability.
In order to control for these and other possible determinants of performance variability,
we apply the Glejser and the modiÞed Glejser tests to our sample.21 To conduct the Glejser
test, we regress the absolute value of the residuals bui from our empirical model for Tobins
Q (section 4.1), on the decision-making centralization index DCi and on a vector of controls
zi which we hypothesize should be associated with the variability in Þrm performance:
|bui| = α + βDCi + θzi + ei (1)
The modiÞed Glejser test uses the square of the residuals, instead of their absolute value:
bu2i = α + βDCi + θzi + ei (2)
In both cases, an F -test of the hypothesis that all slopes equal zero is a test of the null
hypothesis of homoscedasticity against the alternative that the variance of Þrm performance
21The terminology modiÞed Glejser comes from Goldfeld and Quandt (1972).
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is a function of (DCi, zi). Therefore, the two different speciÞcations imply two different al-
ternative hypotheses. To test whether decision-making centralization alone positively affects
the variance of Þrm performance, we use a t-test for the null that the coefficient β ≤ 0 against
the alternative β > 0. High t-statistics are evidence that decision-making centralization is
positively correlated with the variance of Þrm performance. In what follows, we use both the
Glejser and the modiÞed Glejser tests to ensure that the results are not sensitive to small
changes in the alternative hypothesis.22
Our benchmark vector of controls z includes CEO ownership (to control for the agency
argument described in Amihud and Lev, 1981), the degree of diversiÞcation (the number of
different two-digit SIC segment codes), Þrm size (natural log of assets), Þrm age (number
of years since date of incorporation), leverage (book value of long term debt divided by
book assets), CEO tenure (the number of years since the CEO was appointed CEO) and its
square, and one-digit-SIC industry dummies. We expect bigger and older Þrms to exhibit
less variability in performance. We include leverage because of the evidence that leverage is
negatively correlated with variability (see Harris and Raviv, 1991). We include the tenure
variables to control for life-cycle learning effects (see May, 1995), and the industry dummies
to control for the fact that some industries might be inherently more volatile than others.
In Table 5 we report the results of both regressions (1) and (2) for each type of sample,
the panel and the cross-section. The panel regressions include time effects. We do not use
Þrm Þxed-effects in our panel speciÞcation, because our centralization index does not vary
much over time for a given Þrm (the change in the index for the same Þrm, from one year to
the next one is zero approximately 80% of the time).23 In addition, we expect differences in
22Godfrey (1988) shows that the modiÞed Glejser test can be viewed as a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test,
similar to the Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey test (see Greene, 1993), which includes the correction suggested by
Koenker to make the test robust to non-normality.
23In the context of the ownership literature, Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) argue for the use of
Þrm Þxed effects in regressions which relate ownership to Þrm performance. However, Zhou (2001) points
out that if the explanatory variable changes slowly over time (as do ownership and centralization), Þrm
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variability to be more systematically related to industry, which we control for.24 We always
use heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors when calculating our t-statistics, since the
residuals of these regressions are heteroscedastic by construction.25
The null of homoscedasticity is always easily rejected against the alternative that the
variance of Þrm performance is a function of (DCi, zi), as evidenced by the large F -statistics
(the corresponding p−values, which we do not report, are virtually zero). More importantly,
in all four cases reported in Table 5 the coefficient on DC is positive, indicating that more
centralization of decision-making is associated with greater variance in the market valuation
of Þrms. The t-statistics are higher in the cross-sectional sample than in the panel sample,
but even the panel results are signiÞcant for the absolute value speciÞcation (t-statistics are
generally higher in the Glejsers tests than in the modiÞed Glejser tests which use the
square of the residuals).
In Table 6, we augment the set of control variables to include all remaining variables (the
square of ownership, ROA, lagged ROA and Capex/Sales) of the empirical model for the
level of Tobins Q, which we speciÞed in section 4.1. The reason for this is that any variable
which has an effect on the average Tobins Q could potentially have an effect on the higher
moments of Q as well. The results are consistent with those of Table 5. One difference is
that the coefficient on DC has a higher t-statistic. Thus, the use of this larger set of controls
makes it easier for us to accept the hypothesis that centralization is positively correlated
Þxed-effect regressions may fail to detect relationships in the data even when they exist.
24An indirect way to control for Þrm-speciÞc effects is to use Þxed effects in the empirical model for Tobins
Q. This addresses the possibility that the difference in variances is driven by the fact that centralized Þrms
are intrinsically more diverse as a group (and thus the Tobins Q model has less explanatory power for
centralized Þrms). While we do not report these tests here, the results are similar to the ones we report.
25The residuals (ei) of these regression have the following three features: (1) they have non-zero expected
value, (2) they are autocorrelated and (3) they are heteroscedastic. Amemiya (1977) shows that, asymp-
totically, the Þrst two problems vanish (see also Amemiya, 1985). To correct for heteroscedasticity, Greene
(1993) suggests using the asymptotically corrected covariance matrix of White.
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with variability. However, since we have no economic reason for including these additional
variables, we use the benchmark model in Table 5 for the remaining of the paper.
In general, the results of these tests corroborates our previous Þndings thatDC positively
affects the variance of Þrm performance, both cross-sectionally and in the panel sample. In
addition, the tests performed in this section allow us to control for other possible determi-
nants of variance in Þrm performance. For example, even after controlling for CEO owner-
ship, decision-making centralization still affects the variance of Þrm value. This implies that
the centralization index is not simply capturing the particular agency problem emphasized in
Amihud and Lev (1981), Agrawal and Mandelker (1987), and Saunders, Strock and Travlos
(1990). Similarly, the correlation between the DC index and variability does not seem to be
driven by diversiÞcation and other Þrm characteristics such as age and size.
The economic signiÞcance of the coefficient in centralization also appears to be large, as
compared to the coefficients on these other variables. The coefficient on the centralization
index indicates that one less title for the CEO is equivalent to an increase of 11 to 49 years
of Þrm age, 0.6 to 3.2 additional segments, or to a decrease in ownership of 1% to 8%,
depending on the speciÞcation.
4.4 Alternate Performance Measures
In this section, we check the robustness of the results to changes in the variable measuring
performance. Following previous literature, we also use stock returns and return on assets
(ROA hereinafter) as alternate measures of performance. We replicate all our previous tests
using these measures, but in the interest of brevity we discuss only the Glejser tests below.
4.4.1 Empirical Model for Stock Returns
To perform the Glejser test using stock returns we use the residual returns from the market
model with the market return (value-weighted market return from CRSP) as the single
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factor.26 We use monthly stock returns to estimate our betas and residuals for the period
1992-1999.
As in the tests with Q, we use both a cross-sectional and a panel sample of residuals.
To perform the panel tests we construct the residuals for each Þrm-month as the difference
between the stock return for the Þrm in that month, and the market return multiplied by
the Þrms beta. Thus, the Þrms residual return is the component of performance which
cannot be explained by the market model (abnormal performance). Our hypothesis is that
the variability in abnormal performance increases with centralization. Since we use monthly
data for stock returns and annual data for the controls, we adjust the t-statistics for non-
independence within Þrm-year.
To perform the cross-sectional tests we calculate the residual as the difference between
the Þrms average stock return in the time period, and the average market return multiplied
by the Þrms beta.
4.4.2 Empirical Model for ROA
To perform the Glejser test using ROA we use the residuals from the following empirical
model:27
ROA = b0 + b1DC index+ b2CEO ownership+ b3(CEO ownership)
2 + b4 ln (assets)
+b5
Capex
Sales
+ b6Firm age+ b7number of segments+ u
The regression also includes industry dummies and year dummies (in the panel sample).
This is the same empirical model we speciÞed for Tobins Q in section 4.1, except now we
do not use ROA and its lag as regressors.
26We also used total stock returns instead of the residuals and the results were similar.
27We do not report the output of these regressions.
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4.4.3 Results of Glejser Tests using Stock Returns and ROA
In Tables 7 and 8, we show the results of the heteroscedasticity tests, using the following
speciÞcation:
f(bu) = a0 + a1DC index+ a2CEO ownership+ a3CEO tenure+ a4(CEO tenure)2 (3)
+a5leverage+ a6 ln (assets)+ a7Firm age+ a8number of segments+ ²
where bu are the estimated residuals for stock returns or ROA, and f(.) is either the
absolute value function or the square function. This is the same speciÞcation we used in the
Glejser tests for Tobins Q. All speciÞcations include industry dummies and year dummies
(in the panel sample).
The results are again consistent with the previous ones. In particular, the coefficient on
the DC index is positive in all speciÞcations. However, t−statistics are higher for the stock
return tests. The main difference between the Q results and the stock return and ROA
results is that, in the latter tests, the coefficient on DC has higher t−statistics in the panel
sample than in the cross-sectional sample, which is exactly the opposite pattern than in the
Q tests. This indicates that within-Þrm variability is more important for stock returns and
ROA, while the Q results are driven mostly by greater dispersion in performance across
more centralized Þrms. To further investigate this hypothesis, we develop a test that only
takes into account the within-Þrm over-time variability of performance measures in the next
section.
4.5 Centralization and Variability Over Time
In this section we estimate the effect of centralization on the within-Þrm variability of per-
formance. For all Þrms in which the performance measures are available for all years from
1993-1999, we compute the sample standard deviation of Q, ROA and stock returns, using
their yearly values from 1993 to 1999. We also use the standard deviation of the Þrm-speciÞc
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stock returns (the residuals from the market model) as a dependent variable, as in Saunders,
Strock and Travlos (1990). Then, we regress the standard deviations on the possible deter-
minants of variability.28 We use the same set of controls as in equation 3. The data for the
regressors is either an average over the whole period (1992-1999), or the value for the year
1993. We use 1993 as our base year because ExecuComp started in 1992 and thus the 1993
data is more complete.
Table 9 shows the results. In the Q regressions (columns I and II), DC enters positively,
but is not signiÞcantly different from zero at the conventional levels. The effect of central-
ization on ROA and stock returns, however, is positive and signiÞcant for all speciÞcations.
This is consistent with the idea that stock returns and ROA are more volatile over time
than Q, and that this volatility is positively affected by decision-making centralization. The
other coefficients also have the expected signs. Larger, older and more diversiÞed Þrms tend
to have lower variability in performance. Furthermore, higher CEO ownership is positively
correlated with variability.
Table 9 allows us to easily evaluate the economic signiÞcance of the effect of centralization
on variability. For example, one additional title for the CEO (an increase of one in our index,
which is about a one-standard-deviation-change according to Table 1) increases the standard
deviation of residual stock returns by an amount which ranges from 0.002 to 0.004. This
has an effect equivalent to the decrease of two to four segments (more than one standard
deviation in diversiÞcation) to the Þrm. It is also equivalent to 10 to 20 less years of Þrm
age (the coefficient on age is -0.002, and age is multiplied by 10). We can also compare it
with the effect of ownership. One additional title has an equivalent effect to an increase of
approximately 4.4% in CEO ownership. This indicates that the effect of centralization is
signiÞcant, compared to other variables which previous literature has argued can affect the
variability of performance.29
28For an example of this approach in a somewhat different context, see Rodrik (2000).
29Similar results hold when we use ROA instead, or Tobins Q (even though the effect on the latter is
24
5 Conclusion
In this paper we test the theoretical hypothesis that Þrm performance will be more variable as
the number of managers participating in decision-making decreases, i.e. as the Þrm becomes
more centralized. This is an implication of Sah and Stiglitzs (1991) model, in which the
impact of fallibility on Þrm performance depends on the structure of decision-making.
We use characteristics of the Executive Office to develop a proxy for the number of exec-
utives participating in decision-making at a given hierarchical level. We test our hypothesis
using this proxy (which we call the centralization index), and Þnd that the evidence is consis-
tent with Sah and Stiglitzs theory. The results are consistent across performance measures,
and across various tests designed to detect differences in variance. The results hold both
across Þrms and within Þrms. We believe that these results are important for the following
reasons.
First, our results have implications for the evaluation of managers. Martin (2000) argues
that it is difficult to evaluate managers and that the quality of management is observable
only with hindsight. Our results point out that the quality of a manager should be judged
in the context of the impact he has on decision-making. Good (or bad) performance is less
indicative of CEO ability in centralized Þrms than in decentralized Þrms given that all CEOs
are fallible. This argument is analogous to a signal extraction framework in which one should
give more weight to priors when signals are noisy. Here centralization makes signals noisier,
so they should be of less value.
A natural question that arises is whether centralization is good. The governance literature
argues that is it not and advocates the separation of the CEO and Chairman of the Board
positions.30 Our results highlight that centralized Þrms can be those with the worst as well
not statistically signiÞcant). For example, the coefficient on our index is consistently at least as large as the
coefficient on the number of segments.
30The governance literature is more concerned with entrenchment than decision-making, although the two
concepts may sometimes be difficult to disentangle.
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as the best performances. Thus any policy recommendations should not be based on the
consideration of isolated cases. In addition our results point out one cost of decentralization:
performance is less variable but the probability of spectacular performance is also lower.
Third, as Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2001) point out, there is very little empirical
research on volatility at the Þrm level. They discuss several reasons why this could be
important, such as the fact that arbitrageurs face risks related to idiosyncratic volatility, and
the lack of diversiÞcation in many investors portfolios. Our paper suggests that managerial
fallibility and organizational structure may be important for understanding differences in
volatility at the Þrm level.
Volatility is not only important for outside investors, but also for insiders such as
managers whose compensation needs to be tied to performance, as the standard principal-
agent model suggests. When Þrm performance is more volatile, it is more expensive to
provide incentives to risk-averse agents. Thus, our results may have implications for the
structure of compensation packages, an issue we plan to investigate in future research.
However, it is important to stress that our hypothesis does not depend on the existence of
an agency problem. Even if managers are benevolent, there can still be frictions induced by
human fallibility. Our evidence suggests that fallibility itself could be an important avenue
for future research.
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Table 1: Summary of select financial variables, CEO characteristics and our centralization measure  
Sample consists of monthly stock returns and 2,633 firm-years of data for 336 publicly traded, non-regulated firms 
from the 1998 Fortune 500 that were available on Execucomp (2000) during the years 1992-1999. Data on titles is 
constructed from 16,022 executive-years of data for these 336 firms during the years 1992-1999. Most financial data, 
all title data and CEO tenure is from Execucomp (2000). Monthly stock return data (variable name = RET) and market 
returns (variable name = VWRETD) are from CRSP. Remaining financial data and segment data is from Compustat.  
Firm age is collected from Moody's Manuals (1999), proxy statements and 10-Ks for fiscal 1998. Founder data is 
collected from a variety of sources consisting of proxy statements, annual reports and the internet Observations vary 
because of missing data. Our proxy for Tobin’s Q is = (book value of assets-book value of equity+market value of 
equity)/book value of assets. ROA = net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations/book value of 
assets.  Leverage=long-term debt/assets. Firm age = #years since first date of incorporation.  # of segments is equal to 
the number of different 2-digit SIC code industries the firm operates in. CEO tenure is the number of years since the 
CEO was appointed CEO. CEO ownership is defined as the ratio of the number of shares owned by the CEO after 
adjusting for stock splits to total shares outstanding. We define DC index to be the sum of  nocoonopresnoiob iii ,, ,  
founderchairotherpresident iiii ,,, where noiobi in a given year is equal to 1 if no executive mentioned in the firm's 
executive compensation table except the CEO sits on the board in that year, nopresi  ( nocooi ) is equal to 1 in a given 
year if the firm has no president (COO) amongst the executives mentioned in the compensation table for that year, 
presidenti  ( otheri / chairi ) is equal to 1 if the CEO is also the president (has any other title/is also the chairman) in that 
year and founderi  is equal to 1 if the current CEO is the founder of the firm. 
 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Financial variables and CEO characteristics      
      
Tobin’s Q  2595 2.01 1.38 0.81 19.15 
Return on assets ( ROA ) 2633 5.42 5.80 -48.19 48.15 
Stock returns 34158 0.02 0.11 -0.82 2.93 
Value-weighted market returns 34160 0.02 0.04 -0.1 0.08 
Leverage 2598 0.21 0.13 0.00 1.04 
Assets in billions 2633 11.08 26.23 0.02 405.200 
Capital expenditures/Sales 2556 0.07 0.06 0.00 1.28 
# of segments 2540 2.75 1.70 1.00 13.00 
Firm age 2622 55.43 34.53 0.00 147.00 
Firm-years in which insiders other than the 
CEO sit on the board   
2593 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Firm-years in which firm has a President 2593 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Firm-years in which firm has a COO 2593 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
CEO tenure as CEO 2257 7.37 7.22 0.00 47.00 
CEO=President dummy 2349 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 
CEO=Chair dummy 2349 0.86 0.34 0.00 1.00 
CEO has other title dummy 2349 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 
CEO=founder dummy 2413 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
CEO ownership 2304 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.46 
      
Centralization measure      
      
Decision-making centralization ( DC ) index 2349 2.42 1.05 0.00 5.00 
 
 
 
Table 2: Frequency distribution of Decision-making centralization ( DC ) index 
Table 2 shows frequency distribution of DC index. Sample consists of 2,633 firm-years of data for 336 publicly 
traded, non-regulated firms from the 1998 Fortune 500 that were available on Execucomp (2000) during the years 
1992-1999. Data on titles is constructed from 16,022 executive-years of data for these 336 firms during the years 1992-
1999. All title data is from Execucomp (2000). Founder data is collected from a variety of sources consisting of proxy 
statements, annual reports and the internet. Observations vary because of missing data. We define DC index to be the 
sum of  nocoonopresnoiob iii ,, ,  founderchairotherpresident iiii ,,, where noiobi in a given year is equal to 1 if no executive 
mentioned in the firm's executive compensation table except the CEO sits on the board in that year, nopresi  ( nocooi ) is 
equal to 1 in a given year if the firm has no president (COO) amongst the executives mentioned in the compensation 
table for that year, presidenti  ( otheri / chairi ) is equal to 1 if the CEO is also the president (has any other title/is also the 
chairman) in that year and founderi  is equal to 1 if the current CEO is the founder of the firm.  
 
 
 Frequency in sample Percent of sample Cumulative percent of sample 
    
DC  index=0 10 0.43 0.43 
DC  index=1 552 23.5 23.93 
DC  index=2 642 27.33 51.26 
DC  index=3 747 31.8 83.06 
DC  index=4 383 16.3 99.36 
DC  index=5 15 0.64 100.00 
    
Total 2349 100.00  
 
Table 3: Regression of Tobin’s Q  on decision-making centralization ( DC ) index and control 
variables 
 
Table 3 shows OLS regressions of Tobin’s Q  levels on DC  index plus controls.  Sample consists of 2,633 firm-years 
of data for 336 publicly traded, non-regulated firms from the 1998 Fortune 500 that were available on Execucomp 
(2000) during the years 1992-1999.  Most financial data is from Execucomp (2000).  Remaining financial data is from 
Compustat.  Firm age is collected from Moody's Manuals (1999), proxy statements and 10-Ks for fiscal 1998.  Our 
proxy for Tobin’s Q = (book value of assets-book value of equity + market value of equity)/book value of assets.  
Table 1 describes the construction of DC  index. Control variables: CEO ownership is defined as the ratio of the 
number of shares owned by the CEO after adjusting for stock splits to total shares outstanding. ROA =net income 
before extraordinary items and discontinued operations/book value of assets. Firm age=#years since first date of 
incorporation. # of segments=# of 2-digit SIC code segments the firm operates in. Regressions vary by sample type.  
Column I shows a cross-sectional regression estimated on the mean of each variable over the period 1992-1999 for 
each firm.   Column II uses the full panel of observations and includes year dummies. The regressions in both Columns 
include 1-digit SIC code dummies.  Robust t-statistics shown in parentheses.   ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
 
 Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q  
 I II 
DC  index  0.003 0.027 
 (0.107) (0.642) 
CEO ownership 4.692** 6.395** 
 (2.358) (2.044) 
CEO ownership squared -12.973** -21.943** 
 (-2.191) (-2.566) 
ROA  0.092*** 0.209*** 
 (7.297) (10.172) 
Lagged ROA  0.080*** . 
 (6.918) . 
Ln(assets) 0.120*** 0.042 
 (4.302) (0.945) 
Capex/Sales -0.005 1.071 
 (-0.009) (1.033) 
Firm age -0.002*** -0.002 
 (-2.778) (-1.401) 
# segments -0.079*** -0.060** 
 (-5.865) (-2.335) 
Constant 0.008 0.248 
 (0.022) (0.506) 
Sample Type Panel Cross-section 
Year dummies included? Yes No 
Number of observations 2028 331 
R2 0.468 0.671 
F-Statistic 22.070 12.930 
 
 
 
  
Table 4: Heteroscedasticity Tests (Goldfeld-Quandt) for Tobin’s Q  as a function of DC  index and 
control variables 
 
Table 4 shows the results of using the Goldfeld-Quandt heteroscedasticity test to test whether the variance in 
performance in centralized firms is greater than in decentralized firms. We test the null hypothesis that the variance in 
centralized firms is smaller than in decentralized firms against the alternative that it is bigger. We use DC  index to 
partition the sample into centralized and decentralized firms. Table 1 describes the sample and the construction of the 
variables.  For the panel sample we define a firm to be centralized if DC  index>2. For the cross-sectional sample we 
define a firm to be centralized if DC  index>2.5. Columns vary by type of model used to construct residuals of Q  and 
by sample type. The full model used to construct residuals is displayed in Table 3: Q = 0b + 1b DC  index + 2b CEO 
ownership+ 3b CEO ownership squared+ 4b ROA + 5b ln(assets)+ 6b Capex/sales+ 7b Firm age+ 8b # of segments +1-
digit SIC code dummies (+ 9b one period lagged ROA +Year dummies in panel sample). The cross-sectional 
regression is estimated on the mean of each variable over the period 1992-1999 for each firm.  
 
Sub-sample type Test Statistic I II III IV 
Residual sum of squares of 
Q 88.42 1288.24 246.06 2704.7 Centralized 
Degrees of freedom 136 962 171 1394 
Residual sum of squares of 
Q 47.30 859.62 188.25 2229.05 Decentralized 
Degrees of freedom 160 1017 163 1199 
F-statistic 1.87 1.50 1.31 1.21 
P-value 7.47E-05 1.08E-10 0.04 2.71E-04 
Type of model used to create residuals Full Full None None 
Sample Type Cross-section Panel 
Cross-
section Panel 
 
Table 5: Heteroscedasticity Tests (Glejser and modified Glejser) for Tobin’s Q  as a function of DC  index 
and control variables, benchmark model. 
 
Table 5 shows the results of using the Glejser and modified Glejser heteroscedasticity tests to test whether the variance in performance 
in centralized firms is greater than in decentralized firms. Using both the cross-section and the panel we construct residuals iuˆ from the 
following regression in Table 3: Q = 0b + 1b DC  index + 2b CEO ownership + 3b CEO ownership squared + 
4b ROA + 5b ln(assets)+ 6b Capex/sales+ 7b Firm age+ 8b # of segments +1-digit SIC code dummies (+ 9b one period lagged 
ROA +Year dummies in panel sample). We regress the absolute value and the squares of the residuals from this regression on DC  
index and controls including CEO ownership, measured by the ratio of the number of shares owned by the CEO after adjusting for 
stock splits to total shares outstanding, CEO tenure (the number of years since the CEO was appointed CEO) and its square, leverage 
(long-term debt/assets), firm size (natural log of assets),  firm age  (# years since first date of incorporation), and # segments (2-digit 
SIC segments the firm operates in). Table 1 further describes the sample and the construction of the main explanatory variables. 
Columns vary by functional form for the residuals and sample type. The cross-sectional regression is estimated on the mean of each 
variable over the period 1992-1999 for each firm.  All regressions include 1-digit SIC code industry dummies. All coefficients on CEO 
tenure, CEO tenure squared and ln(assets) are multiplied by factors of 100, 1000 and 100, respectively. Robust t-statistics are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable: iuˆ   Dependent variable: 2ˆiu  Dependent variable: iuˆ  Dependent variable: 
2ˆiu  
 I  II  III  IV  
         
DC  index  0.034*  0.242  0.068***  0.126**  
 (1.806)  (1.176)  (2.628)  (2.435)  
CEO ownership 1.716**  9.447  0.905  2.604  
 (2.594)  (1.589)  (0.813)  (0.959)  
CEO tenure 0.150  4.112  0.213  -0.561  
 (0.248)  (0.831)  (0.185)  (-0.201)  
CEO ten.sq. -0.031  -1.486  0.113  0.395  
 (-0.162)  (-0.918)  (0.278)  (0.424)  
Leverage -0.985***  -4.768***  -0.830***  -2.151**  
 (-5.445)  (-4.007)  (-2.724)  (-2.186)  
Ln(assets) 4.287**  31.774**  -0.008  3.288  
 (2.305)  (2.22)  (-0.003)  (0.530)  
Firm age -0.003***  -0.016***  -0.002**  -0.004*  
 (-4.062)  (-2.812)  (-2.192)  (-1.707)  
# segments -0.062***  -0.256***  -0.048***  -0.086**  
 (-5.925)  (-3.561)  (-2.751)  (-2.251)  
Constant 0.786***  0.896  0.500  1.006  
 (3.041)  (0.39)  (0.307)  (0.635)  
Sample Type Panel  Panel  Cross-section  Cross-section  
Year 
Dummies? 
Yes  Yes  No  No  
# Observations 1953  1953  320  320  
R2 0.157  0.057  0.193  0.124  
F-Statistic 7.49  2.63  9.86  3.76  
Table 6: Heteroscedasticity Tests (Glejser and modified Glejser) for Tobin’s Q  as a function of DC  index 
and control variables, full model. 
 
Table 5 shows the results of using the Glejser and modified Glejser heteroscedasticity tests to test whether the variance in performance 
in centralized firms is greater than in decentralized firms. Using both the cross-section and the panel we construct residuals iuˆ from the 
following regression in Table 3: Q = 0b + 1b DC  index + 2b CEO ownership + 3b CEO ownership squared + 
4b ROA + 5b ln(assets)+ 6b Capex/sales+ 7b Firm age+ 8b # of segments +1-digit SIC code dummies (+ 9b one period lagged 
ROA +Year dummies in panel sample). We regress the absolute value and the squares of the residuals from this regression on DC  
index and controls including CEO ownership (the ratio of the number of shares owned by the CEO after adjusting for stock splits to 
total shares outstanding) and its square, CEO tenure  (the number of years since the CEO was appointed CEO) and its square, leverage 
(long-term debt/assets), ROA (net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations/book value of assets) and its first lag, 
firm age (#years since first date of incorporation), # of segments  (the number of 2-digit SIC segments the firm operates in), and 
Capex/Sales (capital expenditures divided by sales) . Table 1 further describes the sample and the construction of the main explanatory 
variables. Columns vary by functional form for the residuals and sample type.The cross-sectional regression is estimated on the mean 
of each variable over the period 1992-1999 for each firm.  All regressions include 1-digit SIC code industry dummies. All coefficients 
on CEO tenure, CEO tenure squared and ln(assets) are multiplied by factors of 100, 1000 and 100, respectively. Robust t-statistics are 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable: iuˆ   Dependent variable: 2ˆiu   Dependent variable: iuˆ  Dependent variable: 
2ˆiu  
 I  II  III  IV  
         
DC  index  0.041**  0.289  0.147***  0.072***  
 (2.148)  (1.317)  (2.633)  (2.914)  
CEO ownership 6.124***  38.702*  15.105***  6.827***  
 (3.299)  (1.648)  (4.016)  (4.315)  
CEO tenure -0.428  0.470  -2.916  -0.858  
 (-0.788)  (0.131)  (-0.977)  (-0.797)  
CEO ten.sq. 0.024  -1.199  0.587  0.216  
 (0.138)  (-0.795)  (0.692)  (0.612)  
Leverage -0.584***  -2.045*  -0.722  -0.393  
 (-3.225)  (-1.830)  (-1.026)  (-1.217)  
Ln(assets) 4.259**  35.282**  1.567  -0.706  
 (2.161)  (2.055)  (0.222)  (-0.259)  
Firm age -0.002***  -0.013***  -0.003  -0.002*  
 (-3.534)  (-2.654)  (-1.535)  (-1.833)  
# segments -0.052***  -0.184***  -0.046  -0.035*  
 (-4.598)  (-3.052)  (-1.208)  (-1.853)  
CEO own.sq.  -17.628***  -116.916  -48.033  -22.047***  
 (-3.161)  (-1.641)  (-3.648)  (-4.907)  
ROA 0.005  0.023  0.064  0.043  
 (0.435)  (0.334)  (0.646)  (0.872)  
Lagged ROA 0.020  0.145**  0.027  -0.014  
 (2.087)**  (2.292)  (0.199)  (-0.262)  
Capex/Sales 0.089  -2.560  0.559  0.551  
 (0.251)  (-0.962)  (0.369)  (0.831)  
Constant 0.386  -1.947  -0.770  0.023  
 (1.155)  (-0.546)  (0.796)  (0.325)  
Sample Type Panel  Panel  Cross-section  Cross-section  
Year Dummies? Yes  Yes  No  No  
# Observations 1953  1953  320  320  
R2 0.183  0.077  0.201  0.274  
F-Statistic 6.97  2.40  1.62  5.86  
Table 7: Heteroscedasticity Tests (Glesjer and modified Glejser) for monthly stock returns as a 
function of DC  index and controls 
Table 7 shows the results of using the Glejser and modified Glejser heteroscedasticity tests to test whether the variance 
in performance (as measured by monthly stock returns ( SR )) in centralized firms is greater than in decentralized firms. 
We use both a panel and a cross-sectional samples. To perform the panel tests we construct the residuals iuˆ  from the 
market model: ittiit uMRSR += β , where SR denotes monthly stock returns, MR denotes the value-weighted 
market return and t ranges from 1992-1999. To perform the cross-section tests we construct the residuals for each firm 
as the difference between the average stock return for the firm in the period, and the average market return multiplied 
by the firm’s beta: MRSRu iii β−= . We regress the absolute value and the squares of the residuals uit in the panel, 
and ui in the cross-section on DC  index and controls that may explain variation in firm performance. Control 
variables: CEO ownership is defined as the ratio of the number of shares owned by the CEO after adjusting for stock 
splits to total shares outstanding, CEO tenure is the number of years since the CEO was appointed CEO.  
Leverage=long-term debt/assets. Firm age=#years since first date of incorporation, # of segments=the number of 2-
digit SIC segments the firm operates in.  Table 1 further describes the sample and the construction of the main 
explanatory variables. Columns vary by functional form for the residuals. All regressions include 1-digit SIC code 
industry dummies and year dummies.  All coefficients on DC  index, CEO ownership, CEO tenure, CEO tenure 
squared, leverage, ln(assets), firm age, # of segments and the constant are multiplied by factors of 100, 100, 1000, 
10000, 100, 100, 1000, 100 and 100, respectively. Since all control variables are measured yearly, we adjust the 
variance estimates for non-independence within firm-year in the panel regressions. Robust t-statistics are in 
parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent Variable: 2ˆiu  Dependent Variable: iuˆ  
 I II III IV 
     
DC  index  0.053*** 0.003 0.183*** 0.105** 
 (3.347) (1.534) (3.679) (2.104) 
CEO ownership 1.079*** 0.095* 6.055*** 2.098 
 (2.738) (1.842) (4.490) (1.499) 
CEO tenure 0.039 0.002 0.110 -0.022 
 (0.621) (0.280) (0.610) (-0.113) 
CEO tenure squared -0.035* -0.002 -0.116** -0.028 
 (-1.957) (-1.082) (-2.102) (-0.492) 
Leverage 0.275** -0.010 1.163*** -0.381 
 (2.031) (-0.942) (2.616) (-1.037) 
Ln(assets) -0.130*** -0.002* -0.485*** -0.066 
 (-8.493) (-1.893) (-9.188) (-1.631) 
Firm age -0.042*** -0.002*** -0.155*** -0.050*** 
 (-6.309) (-3.431) (-8.187) (-3.495) 
# segments -0.020* -0.001 -0.148*** -0.027 
 (-1.724) (-1.342) (-4.698) (-1.018) 
Constant 2.394*** 0.028* 12.474*** 1.611*** 
 (9.984) (1.926) (15.170) (3.669) 
Sample Type Panel Cross-Section Panel Cross-Section 
Year Dummies Included? Yes No Yes No 
Number of Observations 24936 321 24936 321 
R2 0.057 0.194 0.089 0.181 
F-Statistic 20.600 2.050 41.490 2.960 
 
 
Table 8: Heteroscedasticity Tests (Glejser and modified Glejser) for ROA  as a function of DC  index 
and controls 
 
Table 8 shows the results of using the Glejser and modified Glejser heteroscedasticity test to test whether the variance 
in performance in centralized firms is greater than in decentralized firms.  Using both the cross-section and the panel 
we construct residuals  iuˆ from the following regression: ROA = 0b + 1b DC  index + 2b CEO ownership+ 3b CEO 
ownership squared+ 4b ln(assets)+ 5b Capex/sales+ 6b Firm age+ 7b # of segments +1-digit SIC code dummies (+Year 
dummies in panel sample).  We regress the absolute value and the squares of the residuals from this regression on DC  
index and controls that may explain variation in firm performance.  Control variables: CEO ownership is defined as the 
ratio of the number of shares owned by the CEO after adjusting for stock splits to total shares outstanding, CEO tenure 
is the number of years since the CEO was appointed CEO.  Leverage=long-term debt/assets.  Firm age=#years since 
first date of incorporation.  Table 1 further describes the sample and the construction of the main explanatory variables.  
Columns vary by functional form for the residuals and sample type.  The cross-sectional regression is estimated on the 
mean of each variable over the period 1992-1999 for each firm.  All regressions include 1-digit SIC code industry 
dummies.  All coefficients on CEO tenure are multiplied by a factor of 100.  Robust t-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: 2ˆiu  Dependent Variable: iuˆ  
I II III IV 
     
DC  index  2.460 0.573 0.056 0.049 
(1.512) (0.347) (0.730) (0.313) 
CEO ownership 93.663 75.731 7.387*** 8.284 
(1.340) (1.230) (2.844) (1.544) 
CEO tenure -0.296 -0.620 -0.023 -0.047 
(-0.315) (-1.198) (-0.731) (-0.932) 
CEO tenure squared 0.218 0.925 -0.006 0.073 
(0.069) (0.659) (-0.061) (0.527) 
Leverage 1.405 -57.487*** -2.418** -3.465** 
(0.034) (-2.656) (-2.428) (-2.186) 
Ln(assets) -4.330 2.288* 0.033 0.203 
(-1.310) (1.687) (0.358) (1.602) 
Firm age -0.165** -0.088 -0.010*** -0.008* 
(-2.333) (-1.487) (-3.504) (-1.812) 
# segments -4.553*** -2.661*** -0.297*** -0.316*** 
(-3.655) (-2.888) (-6.419) (-3.420) 
Constant 44.704* 48.265** 3.238*** 6.615*** 
(1.779) (2.477) (2.711) (4.440) 
Sample Type Panel Cross-Section Panel Cross-Section 
Year Dummies 
Included? 
Yes No Yes No 
Number of Observations 2089 320 2089 320 
R2 0.034 0.134 0.075 0.160 
F-Statistic 5.600 11.180 7.880 12.520 
Table 9: Cross-sectional regression of standard deviations of Tobin’s Q , Monthly Raw and Residual Stock Returns ( SR ) 
and ROA  over the 1993-1999 period on decision-making centralization ( DC ) index and control variables in 1993 and 
averaged over the 1992-1999 period 
Table 9 shows cross-sectional OLS regressions of the standard deviation in performance measures computed for each firm over 1993-1999 
period on DC  index plus controls measured in 1993 as well as on DC  index plus controls averaged over the 1992-1999 period.Table 1 
describes the sample and the construction of DC  index. Our proxy for Tobin’s Q is (book value of assets-book value of equity + market value 
of equity)/book value of assets. ROA =net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations/book value of assets.  Control 
variables: CEO ownership is defined as the ratio of the number of shares owned by the CEO after adjusting for stock splits to total shares 
outstanding. CEO tenure is the number of years since the CEO was appointed CEO. Leverage=long-term debt/assets.  Firm age=#years since 
first date of incorporation, # of segments=the number of 2-digit SIC segments the firm operates in.    Regressions vary by dependent variable, 
regressors and sample type. In Columns I-II the dependent variable is the standard deviation of Tobin’s Q  over 1993-1999.  In Columns III and 
IV the dependent variable is the standard deviation of ROA  over 1993-1999.  In Columns V-VI (VII-VIII) the dependent variable is the 
standard deviation of raw (residual) monthly stock returns ( SR ) over 1993-1999. We construct the residual stock returns iuˆ  from the market 
model: ittiit uMRSR += β , where SR denotes monthly stock returns, MR denotes the value-weighted market return and t ranges from 
1992-1999.  Cross-sectional (‘Average’) regressions are estimated on the mean of each independent variable over 1992-1999.  In the regressions 
for 1993, all independent variables are measured in 1993.  The regressions in all Columns include 1-digit SIC code dummies.  All coefficients 
on CEO tenure, CEO tenure squared and firm age are multiplied by factors of 100, 1000 and 10, respectively.  Robust t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses.   ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
 
 Dep. Var.: )(Qsd  Dep. Var.: )(ROAsd  Dep. Var.: )(SRsd (raw) Dep. Var.: )(SRsd (resid.) 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
         
DC  index  0.056 0.064 0.607*** 0.321** 0.004** 0.003* 0.004** 0.002* 
 (1.082) (1.454) (3.274) (2.307) (2.512) (1.861) (2.533) (1.766) 
CEO ownership 2.650* 4.329 3.029 5.151 0.088** 0.044 0.090** 0.045 
 (1.706) (1.499) (0.734) (0.893) (2.416) (1.232) (2.551) (1.341) 
CEO tenure 2.397* 1.339 -6.326 1.510 -0.006 -0.015 -0.037 -0.037 
 (1.617) (0.985) (-0.968) (0.328) (-0.084) (-0.318) (-0.500) (-0.864) 
CEO ten.squared -0.866* -0.726 1.289 -0.555 -0.019 -0.003 -0.011 0.004 
 -(1.759) -(1.627) (0.554) (-0.393) (-1.053) (-0.234) (-0.650) (0.279) 
Leverage -1.732*** -1.018*** -1.275 -1.784* 0.005 0.012 0.008 0.010 
 (-5.259) (-2.619) (-0.991) (-1.654) (0.383) (1.222) (0.592) (1.064) 
Ln(assets) 0.052* 0.005 -0.358** -0.103 -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.011*** -0.007*** 
 (1.820) (0.127) (-2.103) (-0.719) (-6.048) (-5.364) (-6.339) (-5.472) 
Firm age -0.032*** -0.029** 0.005*** -0.014 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (-2.899) (-2.030) (0.080) (-0.220) (-4.566) (-3.462) (-4.443) (3.299) 
# segments -0.065*** -0.060*** -0.318*** -0.203** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* 
 (-3.207) (-3.564) (-2.927) (-2.373) (-0.609) (1.103) (-0.724) (-1.708) 
Constant 0.485 0.160 6.054*** 3.365 0.155*** 0.148*** 0.156*** 0.147*** 
 (1.172) (0.199) (3.735) (1.572) (8.226) (8.581) (8.494) (8.921) 
Sample Type Averaged 1993 Averaged 1993 Averaged 1993 Averaged 1993 
# Observations 321 258 321 258 321 258 321 258 
R2 0.248 0.29 0.149 0.115 0.421 0.412 0.432 0.420 
F-Statistic 3.640 3.23 2.04 2.71 13.570 12.590 13.600 14.860 
 
 
Figure 1: Best and worst performances and centralization 
 
Figure 1 shows plot of residuals iuˆ for centralized and decentralized firms.  Residuals iuˆ are obtained from the 
following regression in Table 3: Q = 0b + 1b DC  index + 2b CEO ownership+ 3b CEO ownership 
squared+ 4b ROA + 5b ln(assets)+ 6b Capex/sales+ 7b Firm age+ 8b # of segments +1-digit SIC code dummies, where 
all variables are averaged over the 1992-1999 time period.  We categorize firms as centralized if DC  index is in the 
5th quintile.  We categorize firms as decentralized if DC  index is in the 1st quintile. 
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